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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

Case No.

12551

TOMMY OTIS FAIR,
Defendant-Appellant.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged with the crime of illegal sale
of a narcotic drug in the Third Judicial District Court
in and for Salt Lake County.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was convicted by a jury of the crime
charged and he appeals that conviction.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent prays that the decision of the lower court
be affirmed.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent agrees basically with the facts as stated
by appellant except as hereinafter set forth.
The trial court knew that there was another case
pending against appellant for a similar sale (T. 24).
Appellant had been convicted of a number of felonies (T.
75). Mr. Dawson, the undercover agent, testified during
the time that the jury was excluded that he had previously purchased heroin from appellant, that on those
occasions appellant had the heroin in his possession, (T.
27), and that he told appellant that he was going to sell
it for $12 (T. 31).
The court specifically informed Mr. Mcintyre, defense counsel, and Mr. Fair that they could decide
whether or not to examine Mr. Dawson in the presence
of the jury (T. 31). Appellant and his counsel chose not
to do so, presumably as a matter of trial strategy.
Mr. Dawson testified that when he approached appellant and asked if appellant had any heroin, "he said that
he didn't but he would get some for me" (T. 11). Mr.
Dawson informed appellant that the dope was for him
and his partner and that they were probably going to
re-sell it for a higher price (T. 12). Appellant asked,
"Have you checked with your partner to see if you want
to cop?" Mr. Dawson said, "Yes," and handed appellant
the two $10 bills (T. 13). On redirect examination, Mr.
Dawson was asked, "Were you going to attempt to have
Fair go out and buy some?" The answer was, "He had
already said that he would go out" (T. 36).
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It was stipulated that the reason for appellant's
attire in the court was because appellant was in prison
for a parole violation (T. 7). The court cautioned the
jury that this stipulation had nothing to do with the
question of guilt or innocence (T. 8).

There is no reason to assume that the jurors were
prejudiced against appellant, and the stipulation to his
appearing in prison attire was agreed to by his counsel.
In a letter sent by Mr. Fair to Vernon Romney which
was forwarded to Mr. Steven Love, Executive Secretary
of the Board of Pardons, dated December 28, 1971, appellant outlined his recent history with the Board of Pardons.
On January 6, 1971, appellant was given a hearing by
the Board of Pardons where it was decided (1) to revoke
his parole and (2) to wait until the outcome of his trial
for final determination of his next rehearing date. After
trial, the Board set April, 1976, as the date for appellant's
next rehearing. In view of appellant's previous record
and experience with the Board of Pardons, it cannot be
presumed that the rehearing date set by the board was
so set in abeyance to the statute rather than in the exercise of prudent discretion.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN RECEIVING TESTIMONY FROM THE PROSECUTION WITNESS IN THE ABSENCE OF
THE JURY.
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The law on entrapment in Utah is set forth in State
v. Pacheco, 13 Utah 2d 148, 369 P. 2d 494, 496 (1962):
"If the crime was in fact so instigated or induced by what the officer did that the latter's
conduct was the generating cause which produced
the crime, and without which it would not have
been committed, the defendant should not be convicted. On the other hand, if the defendant's attitude of mind was such that he desired and intended to commit the crime, the mere fact that
an officer or someone else afforded him the opportunity to commit it would not constitute entrapment which would be a defense to its commission;
and this would not be less true even though an
undercover man went along with the defendant in
the criminal plan and aided or encouraged him in
it."
This standard of entrapment focuses not only upon the
undercover agent's conduct but on the defendant's "attitude of mind" concerning his desire or intent to commit
the crime.

The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Perkins, 19
Utah 2d 421, 432 P. 2d 50, 52 (1967), held:
"In determining whether entrapment is a defense, we must draw a line between trapping unwary, innocent people who are not inclined to com·
mit the crime, and trapping an unwary criminal
who gets caught in his own schemes because of
his misplaced confidence."
The court further held that the trier of fact "must know
the predisposition of the defendant to commit or not to
commit
crimes" in order to determine on which
side of the line the defendant is to be placed. Id. at 52.
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In detcrrnini21g a defendant's predisposition to sell
narcotics, evidence of his p:'.'ior conduct becomes material.
However, without careful e::ercise of judicial discretion,
evidenc2 of p 10ior conduct could be used to smear a defePClant and unjustly prejudice a jury. For this reason,
a judge has the discretion to exclude evidence if he finds
a danger of undue prejudice or of confusing the issues or
cf misleading the jury.
The court knew that there was another case pending
against appellant for a similar sale (T. 24). Appellant
had been convicted of a number of felonies (T. 75). Mr.
Dawson, the undercover agent, testified during the time
that the jury was excluded that he had previously purchased heroin from appellant, that on those occasions
appellant had the heroin in his possession (T. 27), and
that he told appellant that he was going to sell it for
$12 (T. 31). Given this prior conduct showing appellant's
predisposition to sell narcotics a jury could easily have
found no entrapment to have taken place, notwithstanding circumstances which might have suggested otherwise.
Rather than risk prejudicial error, the trial court actually
protected appellant against possible prejudice by wisely
and properly excluding the jury while the court made its
dd2rmination whether there was entrapment as a matter
or law.
The exclusion of evidence beneficial to appellant was
not error on the part of the court. The court specifically
informed Mr. Mcintyre, defense counsel, and Mr. Fair
that they could decide whether or not to examine Mr.
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Dawson in the presence of the jury (T. 31). Thus, any
evidence supporting appellant's position that was not presented to the jury was a result of appellant's choice of
trial tactics. Justice Crockett, writing for the majority in
State v. Lopez, 22 Utah 2d 257, 451 P. 2d 772, 776 (1969),
said: "The matter of trial tactics is not the concern of
the court, but of the defendant and his counsel." Thus,
the ineffectual trial tactics of appellant should not be
imputed as error of the lower court.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ALLOWING THE JURY TO DECIDE THE
ISSUE OF ENTRAPMENT INASMUCH AS
THERE WAS EVIDENCE UPON WHICH
REASONABLE MINDS COULD DIFFER.
In the recent Utah Supreme Court decision of State
v. Schultz, Case No. 12751, filed May 4, 1972, the court
stated:
"If it is so clear that all reasonable minds must
find one way, then the trial court should rule as a
matter of law and take the issue from the jury.
Conversely, if there is a basis in the evidence upon
which reasonable minds could differ, then the dete1mination should be made by the jury."
Since the facts before the judge in the instant case
conflict, reasonable minds could differ as to the conclusions to be drawn. Mr. Dawson testified that when he
approached appellant and asked if appellant had any
heroin "he said that he didn't but he would get some for

'
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me" (T. 11). Mr. Dawson informed appellant that the
dope was for him and his partner and that they were
probably going to re-sell it for a higher price (T. 12).
Appellant asked, "Have you checked with your partner
to see if you want to cop?" Mr. Dawson said "Yes," and
handed appellant the two $10 bills (T. 13). On redirect
examination, Mr. Dawson was asked, "Were you going to
attempt to have Fair go out and buy some?" The answer
was, "He had already said that he would go out" (T. 36).
Mr. Dawson testified that he had previously purchased
heroin from appellant and that on those occasions appellant had the heroin in his possession (T. 27). All this
testimony concerning appellant's intent to sell narcotics,
a key element of entrapment, was controverted by appel·
!ant's testimony. Since reasonable minds may differ as
to whom they shall believe, the lower court did not err
in allowing the jury to decide the issue of entrapment.
The fact that appellant had no drugs in his possession
does not diminish his intent to sell. In State v. Perkins,
supra, the court held:
"It is no defense that a peddler of narcotics
does not keep the drug upon his person ... In case
of a sale it is just as much a crime for him to have
a secret source where he can readily secure the
narcotic as it is for him to have the narcotic on
his person." 432 P. 2d at 53.
Thus, in the instant case, the fact that appellant had to
go to his supplier cannot diminish his culpability.
Appellant alleges that Mr. Dawson played upon
appellant's sympathies as a fellow addict by saying that
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he '7<1-3 sick. Eo\.:ever, the court in Lisby v. State, 414
P. 2d 592, 594 (Nev. 1966), held: "Playing upon the defendant's sympathies by telling him that narcotics were
for addicts badly in need is no defense."

A fact situation much more complex than the present
case was held not to be entrapment as a matter of law in
People v. Moran, 463 P. 2d 763 (Cal. 1970). There, the
undercover agent, a friend of the defendant, approached
the defendant about some LSD for a friend. The defen· '
dant said he had none and did not know where to get
any. Later, the agent returned and asked the defendant
if he were certain he knew no source of LSD. The de·
fendant said he had some tablets but that they were for
his own use. The agent appealed to the defendant's
friendship but the defendant refused to sell any. During
the same day, the agent again appealed to the defendant's
friendship for the third time saying that if their positions
were reversed he would sell some to the defendant. The
defendant finally agreed to sell some capsules. The court
held that the evidence did not establish entrapment as
a matter of law. If such continuous encouragement and
prodding has been held not to establish entrapment as !
a matter of law, certainly the simple fact situation in the
instant case does not compel a finding of entrapment as ,
a matter of law. Upon such a question of fact the court
was correct in allowing the jury to decide whether appel·
la:it had been entrnpped.

POINT III.
THERE WAS NO PREJUDICE TO APPELLANT BECAUSE OF HIS APPEARANCE IN
COURT IN PRISON ATTIRE.
A trial wherein defendant appears in prison attire
is not inherently prejudicial depending upon all the facts
of the case. Xanthull v. Beto, 307 F. Supp. 903 (S. D.
Tex. 1970). The facts in the instant case show no attempt on the part of defense counsel to object to appellant's wearing of prison attire. Defense counsel did explain to the jury the reason for the attire of appellant
(T. 5). It was stipulated by defendant's counsel that the
reason for the attire was that appellant was in prison for
a parole violation (T. 7). The court cautioned the jury
that this stipulation had nothing to do with the question
of guilt or innocence of the crime charged (T. 8). Appellant testified that he had been convicted of several felonies (T. 75).
The court in Collins v. State, 106 P. 2d 273 (Old.
1940), found that even though the trial court erred by

refusing to allow defendant to be tried in civilian clothes,
the error was not prejudicial because the facts of the case
established the basic elements of the cri.'Tie. The facts
of the present case show that there was no prejudice to
appellant because of his appearance in prison attire even
though it may be preferable for a defendant to wear civilian clothing. Since appellant admitted several prior convictions for felonies, it is difficult to see how his wearing
of prison clothes would inflame the jury against him.
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Appellant also alleges that prison clothes make him less
believable than Mr. Dawson because the clothes reflect
on his past conduct. However, this is unlikely because
the record clearly shows that Mr. Dawson's prior conduct
was similarly blemished (T. 15, 16).
The court in People v. Shaw, 151 N. W. 2d 381
(Mich. 1967), held that the matter of a defendant's garb
at trial is a procedural right and like many other procedural rights, it may be lost if not properly asserted. The
record does not show that appellant's counsel made any
effort to have appellant appear in civilian clothing. Having failed to make timely objection at the trial, appellant
may not now assert prejudicial error on appeal.
POINT IV.
THE STATUTE UNDER WHICH APPELLANT WAS SENTENCED IS CONSTITUTIONAL AND THE SENTENCE WAS LAWFUL.
The section of Utah Code Ann. § 58-13a-44 (8) (as
amended 1969) which appellant contends is unconstitutional reads:
". . . and shall not be eligible for release upon
completion of sentence or on parole or on any
other basis until he has served not less than three
years in prison."
Appellant has no standing to contest this statutory
provision. After appellant's arrest for the charge which
is the subject of the instant action, a detainer was placed
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on him. On January 6, 1971, appellant was given a hearing by the Board of Pardons at which it was decided (1)
to revoke his parole (appellant had been on parole for
a prior conviction) and (2) to wait until the outcome of
the trial below before final determination of his next rehearing date. After trial, the Board of Pardons set April
1976, five years hence, as the date for appellant's next
rehearing. This action by the Board of Pardons was pursuant to authority granted by Utah Code Ann. § 77-62-3
(1953) as correctly cited in appellant's brief. Thus even
if this court found the contested portion of statute unconstitutional, it would have no effect upon appellant's
rehearing date. Since appellant cannot show that he has
been affected in any way to his detriment by the contested section of Section 44, he has no standing to assert
its unconstitutionality.
Even if part of Section 44 were found to be unconstitutional, "the void part may be disregarded, and the
valid part enforced." State v. Nielsen, 19 Utah 2d 66,
426 P. 2d 13 (1967). The Uniform Narcotics Act has a
"saving clause" which reads:
"If any provision of this act or the application
thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of the act which can be
given effect without the invalid provision or application and to this end the provisions of this act
are declared to be severable." L. Utah 1969, Ch.
170, Sec. 16.

'Ihe provision requiring at least a three year prison term
before possible parole is easily severable from the rest of
Section 44 leaving the rest of it intact and valid.
Appellant's contention that Section 44 (12) contains
the proper sentence for him does not follow from its
wording. That section does not apply where "special imprisonment and fine provisions have been specified." It
is clear that Section 44 (8) provides imprisonment from
5 years to life which would remain valid even if the contested portion were struck down. Thus, appellant's sentence of 5 years to life must be upheld.

CONCLUSION
The lower court did not err in allowing the issue of
entrapment to go to the jury because there was evidence
upon which reasonable minds could differ. The lower
court properly held its discussion, of ruling as a matter
of law, out of the presence of the jury to protect against
possible prejudice to appellant. The defense counsel's
tactic of not re-examining the agent in the presence of
the jury cannot be imputed as error on part of the court.
Finally, appellant's sentence of five years to life is con·
stitutional and not affected by any other portion of the
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statute that may be held unconstitutional. Thus, the
decision and finding of the lower court must be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
DAVID S. YOUNG
Chief Assistant Attorney General
DAVID R. IRVINE
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

